

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BLOGGERS ROUNDTABLE WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM CALDWELL, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER AND FORT LEAVENWORTH, VIA TELECONFERENCE SUBJECT: U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 3-0 OPERATIONS TIME: 11:00 P.M. EST DATE: TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2008

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CHARLES "JACK" HOLT (chief, New Media Operations, OASD PA): Like to welcome you to the Bloggers Roundtable. Thank you for joining us here today and if you've got an opening statement, sir, the floor is yours.

GEN. CALDWELL: All right. Well, thanks, Jack. I appreciate that. For many of you all, I've spoken to you before when I first arrived here at Fort Leavenworth about seven months ago and took command. And I'll just share with you, in the last seven months, it's been a real eye-opening experience for me -- (audio break) -- doctrine to the United States Army, an element I had not previously had the opportunity to serve in. I'm absolutely amazed each and every day how many cool things are taking place here at this institution, the depth and breadth of what we actually deal with on -- (audio break) -- so thank you all for joining us. I would tell you, I think you all know this is our first major rewrite of the Army's capstone document since the terrorist attacks of September 11th in 2001. It's also the latest edition of our operations manual which we are going to release, obviously, as you know, here in about two or three more days, Thursday of this week. The most fundamental shift from previous doctrine is that -- again, this is something you'll probably start hearing about, but it's very highly debated and discussed -- is the elevation of stability operations beyond the same level of importance as a defensive and offensive operation.

It's a recognition that stability ops are as important, perhaps even if not more so than traditional combat operation. Our FM 3-0 operations manual is truly our blueprint for operating here in this uncertain future. With our Army at war for these past six-plus years now, lessons learned from that experience as well as best practices from in the field really will drive changes, the way our Army operates over the next 10 to 15 years. And that's a big part of what we have tried to take and incorporate and capture for this capstone manual.

There are several other changes, too, to this new manual that make it a very dynamic one for both our leaders and our soldiers. That's that there's an operational concept in here that forms the core of our doctrine. And it's much the way that (alien ?) battle did years ago for our forces, you know, decades ago now. This new operational concept would do the same for us today. Information operations, information superiority also has taken a new level of importance in this manual and recognize its criticality in the 21st century.

So we have taken -- put a lot of discussion in this manual on that, trying to capture that whole area as we continue to evolve in a more better understanding about what's going on there. And then there's an emphasis on the art of command that stresses knowledge and understanding really over a process in technology; in other words, a renewed focus on the human dimension of leadership.

Our chief of staff, General Casey, has said -- and I'll lift a quote kind of from it; it goes generally something like, you know, we have to emphasize doctrine as the driver for change. And we'll never cement change into our organizations until we adapt our institution. And that change all begins with our doctrinal manual FM 3-0.

So, anyways, that's kind of the opening there to sort of set the stage. I do have -- learned over the years to bring like the resident smart guys. I don't go anywhere or do anything and I have them both with me. I have our chief of doctrine who oversees all of our doctrinal development here at Fort Leavenworth, Clint Ancker with me here today. And then I've also got his lead writer for FM 3-0, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Leonard here, too. Both of them have been working this now for over three years, as they say. You know, in my seven months, this has been our number-one priority that I've been out here. The chief of staff -- I will tell, you will not find a more vetted, coordinated, integrated manual than this one. Clint who has been doing this for many years will tell you that we have never spent as much time going through the rigors of having discussions with all of those kind of young soldiers, the captains to majors to lieutenant colonels and colonels. The Army War College, Command General Staff College down are -- (inaudible) -- courses. We've reached out and tried to touch as many folks within the media. We've gone to private think tanks, talked to NGOs. We really have tried to get a lot of input and comments on this manual. But when it came out, it was really reflective of what we have learned over -- (audio break) -- incorporating all of those lessons learned into it so we kind of figure out how we're going to navigate here over the next -- (audio break).

Anyways, with that, I'll be glad to open it up, take any questions anybody has and if I can't answer it, we have two smart guys here that can. So, Jack, I'll shift it back to you.

MR. HOLT: All right, sir, thank you very much. And we've got a little static on the line, but I think we can work through that. Andrew, you were first on the line so why don't you get us started.

Q General, Andrew Lubin from Military Observer. How are you doing, sir?

GEN. CALDWELL: Doing good, Andrew.

Q Good. Things are going real well for you. Good to see that. Sir, I've got kind of a two-part question here. Reading a lot about there's a fair amount of Army institutional pushback to the idea of stability operations being co-equal with offensive and defensive operations. There is -- and I wish I had the articles to cite for you. The concept is that the Army is getting away from its ability to fight the big one, so to speak. Can you comment on that?

And, also, what kind of training are you giving the young lieutenants and the staff NCOs because they're the ones that they're actually working and

talking with the locals. You know, the Marines have Mojave Viper. What does the Army do to kind of prepare their young men for this?

GEN. CALDWELL: Hey, Andrew, it's good to talk to you again. It's been a while since the dialogue out there in Iraq, but -- a few things I'd say. One is, in terms of the pushback, there is a reluctance. You know, throughout my entire military career, I was taught that if, in fact, you can conduct operations at the high-end level, major wars, then you can do any lesser, including this type of activity.

What these past years have shown us is that's not the case. There are, in fact, specific skill sets and organizational elements that we need within our Army to operate in this environment that we're operating in today. So the intent of this manual, 30, which will obviously drive subsequent manuals that we will publish here over the next, well, anywhere from three to six months, a couple more key ones, we'll in fact start to change that so that our Army understands how critical it is for us to be able to conduct these lesser-type activities that are in the wide spectrum of operations. And the FM-7-0 are training -- that will come out here probably in about two months, which has been worked in tandem with 30 the whole way. We in fact take and show it very graphically on a chart that our focus and effort is not all at the high end anymore, but somewhere just short of that. We ensure we're including the lesser-type environment that we find ourselves operating in.

In terms of preparing our young soldiers for this environment, obviously, you know, this is what everything eventually rolls about, heads towards. And we are in fact making a major effort in shifting everything from cultural astuteness, awareness, and inculcating that in the training very early on, helping our young men and women understand that their actions in fact have strategic implications. Years ago you heard about the strategic corporal. Well, I think we've all come to understand now it's the strategic private out -- (audio break) -- that exist because what they do in fact frankly affects everything else today, especially with the information medium that we operate on -- (audio break) -- rapidly and so widely than -- (audio break).

MR. HOLT: All right, sir.

Q Great, thank you.

MR. HOLT: And, sir, you were kind of fading out a little bit there. You were kind of fading out on us there a little bit so just to note that. Bruce McQuain, you were next on line so go right ahead.

Q Thanks, Jack. General, Bruce McQuain with QandO.net.

Obviously, doctrinal changes drive force-structure changes. I'm interested in what force-structure changes are being recommended to implement this doctrinal change.

GEN. CALDWELL: I think the most immediate that you're going to see is an increase in civil affairs organizations. And the other one that we have been putting a lot of focus and effort, you'll see additionally, obviously, more special forces if battalions come online, which have already been improved and we'll start training up as we bring those online. And then, we're also now working with this thing called TMAAG, theater military advisory assistance group, 106- person element that would be associated with a COCOM that would enable us to have ongoing engagement within the theater; rather than being

reactive, the intent here would be proactive. And then, as they need additional forces to help conduct op-route exercises, engagements or other things within that region, they can then come back to the what's called general-purpose forces and get those assets to assist them in that effort.

But there's more work that's got to be done. Bruce, when we publish this manual officially on Thursday, it's going to require us to go back and look again because there are new elements in here that were not resonant in our doctrinal manuals up until just now.

Q If I could follow-up on that TMAAG. I assume this is -- from what you said, I just really want a clarification that this is a group that will essentially be resident in particular areas at all times.

GEN. CALDWELL: That's correct. It would be assigned to the combatant commanders' theater and be there all the time; and then additional forces would flow into it as they conduct some kind of training exercise or engagement event in the theater.

Q Can you tell me what level command that would be?

GEN. CALDWELL: Right now, the TMAAG commander is a colonel, an O6.

Q Okay, thanks very much.

MR. HOLT: Okay, and Paul McCleary?

Q Hi. Paul McCleary, DTI. How are you?

GEN. CALDWELL: Doing great, thank you.

Q This question, I guess, kind of jumps off from the previous question. You mentioned the information superiority in different theaters, and that obviously goes hand-in-hand with cultural knowledge. How do you marry the two in the new field manual to the TMAAG program?

GEN. CALDWELL: Well, obviously we almost see them hand-in-hand. The intent of the TMAAG element would be people who have cultural astuteness and some resident language skills that would be operating within that organization. Not necessarily everybody right off the bat, but that would occur over time. But the intent would be they would have that kind of capability to understand the people, the population, the culture and their language skills to talk.

There's also, you know, what we stood up over in Iraq and Afghanistan, these human terrain teams, where we bring in cultural anthropologists and other personnel like that -- have unique skill-sets that help us better understand the people, the culture, the population, the area, the customs so that we, when operating in different locales, would have these kind of experts, that have done this all their life, to help advise and guide us so that we, in fact, can establish a more -- solidify a more positive relationship with them and work in tandem with them towards achieving the same objectives.

Q Great. Can I have a quick follow-up?

GEN. CALDWELL: Sure.

Q The TMAAG groups, are these purely military or are they military and civilian, and are you planning on unfolding the HTT teams into this group?

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. Right now, the TMAAG is all uniformed personnel. But we absolutely see the importance of this thing operating in tandem as an interagency element. You know, that's a real challenge we have across the board, not just with this manual but in general, that we now know we will never go to war again unless we go as the whole of government. The idea that, you know, years ago we fought as a service, then we fought as a joint element; today, we will always fight as a joint, interagency, multinational organization and therefore that whole aspect of the interagency is critical and we need to continue working on that.

Q Great, thank you.

MR. HOLT: Okay, and Matthew Dess (sp)?

Q Thank you very much.

A question about the TMAAG teams: Will they be using local residents or are they just people from the Army and civilians associated with the military?

GEN. CALDWELL: Right. Right now, they'll be personnel from the military that have obviously received training in that region of the world.

Q Okay, so you're not planning on using local residents?

GEN. CALDWELL: Well, they'll tie in; and in fact, you know, there's nothing to say they can't contract them on to help augment certain elements of the team, or something like that. Again, our intent right now is to get a pilot stood up down in SOUTHCOM, using USARSO as the base under which it would operate and hopefully, do that within the next year, to start trying to pull that team together so that we can, in fact, flesh this out and figure out what really is needed. But obviously, we've been doing a tremendous amount of work and the fact that we can now say it's a 106-person organization and generally how it functions. And for any of you all who are interested, we'd be glad to provide a detailed briefing on that. You know, we could set up another conference call; we could -- you know, if you send us what you would like through Jack, we'll be glad to get somebody to come back to you on e-mail to send you some more specific information. But we'd be more than willing to share that.

MR. HOLT: Yes, and you guys got my e-mail address, so just let me know and we'll work that. Okay, Richard.

Q Hi, good morning, General.

Richard Miller from Talk Radio News.

General, the last Army reorganization that we were following, or at least I was following, was General Schoomaker's aspiration for a 70-brigade combat team force structure. And I'm wondering how this integrates with that. In other words, when these BCTs are deployed, do the TMAAGs and related stabilization forces, do they now become a new component of the BCT?

GEN. CALDWELL: Not really. The idea of a TMAAG is that it never becomes an operational headquarters at all. Rather, it serves to facilitate,

coordinate and help direct the completion of elements, but it in fact doesn't itself become operationalized. We talked at length about that over, you know, the last six or eight months with General Casey, and that's been a real key aspect of how we have looked at what TMAAG would do. Again, our intent there for TMAAG is it would be engaged early on, like today, in different areas of the world, versus being reactive after the fact so that we can, in fact, establish those types of relationships and ongoing dialogue and exchanges. And this is when there are no ongoing kind of military operations.

Q A follow-up question, sir, if I might.

Does that mean that if, as and when brigade combat teams are deployed and wind up having to perform stabilization functions, are you now going to add or enhance the stabilization training of your strategic privates, so to speak, coming in across the board in the event that we wind up having to occupy with a large force, say another Iraq or a situation in which large numbers of U.S. troops are being asked to provide stabilization?

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah, absolutely. And under this concept of the Army forces generation model, which you hear called ARFORGEN, that's in fact exactly what they want to do. They have this thing called a CMETL and a DMETL, with the CMETL being your core mission-essential task-list that you would always be able to execute, and then there's a directed mission and essential task list. So 12 to 18 months out before a unit would deploy, they would be handed their directed mission-essential task list, which would in fact direct them to be able to conduct things like specific aspects of stability operations, and then, of course, lead to force tailoring and request for additional forces of whatever particular kind. We have been capturing all of that in this new FM-7-0 manual, again, that we should release in about two or three months.

And, again, if somebody is interested in having a sit-down with them or talk to them or, again, going through e-mails, we could work it that way. Or doing a bloggers conference, we could talk about FM- 7-0, our new training manual, and how this directed METL, mission- essential task-list, METL and the core METL works and their relationship to FM 3-0, as is going to be laid out in our new FM-7-0 manual.

Q All right, and General, if I might, just one last follow- up. I apologize if I'm taking too much airtime. From the standpoint of a recruit coming in, then aside from physical-endurance training, weapons, so on and so forth, you would be adding -- would it be closer to police-type training that you've been giving MPs or what would he be told -- or she be told -- at the recruiting office about this -- how their lives might change once in?

GEN. CALDWELL: For the brand-new recruit coming in, what I would say - - the change you're going to see is a emphasis on cultural awareness not astuteness yet. They are not advanced enough, but that is going to be critical right up front in the initial entry training of all our new soldiers coming into the Army.

And then as they progress through their training and move towards their units -- and obviously, it would shift based upon their directed mission-essential task list, their directed mission, and take more into working the aspects of cultural astuteness. You know, we have mobile-training teams now that we're seeing now from the Defense Language Institute going to organizations that are getting instructions to go to Iraq or Afghanistan, and in fact, beginning to conduct language training, cultural training with those

organizations eight months to a year and a half out before they deploy because we have come to appreciate how significantly important that is to what we're doing over there. And, again, we would hope to become more proficient and capable at that with time.

Q Thank you, sir.

MR. HOLT: Okay. Richard Lowry.

Q Good morning, sir. This is Richard Lowry with op-for.com. I'd like to switch the subject just a little bit and ask you if your operations manual will address doctrine for fighting a three-bloc war in a large modern urban environment, in an environment that has skyscrapers and subways, in a place where the civilian population just can't get out of the way.

GEN. CALDWELL: My answer to that would be, yes, probably not in the detail you are thinking, but FM 3-06 that we will also be doing as a follow-on to FM 3-0 will, in fact, specifically get at that. And this is a new manual for us generally that we're putting out there. Yeah. Yeah, let me ask my guys. The last update was October -- yeah, 2006, that we did do that one.

Q Thank you.

MR. HOLT: All right, Matt Armstrong.

Q Hi, good morning. General, we met at the New Media Workshop recently at Carlisle. The whole government approach is something that we have talked about and certainly necessary. Everything that we do is dependent on information. Reconstruction, stabilization, for example, is critical and based on winning the struggle for the minds and will of the local people. If the people don't know we're winning, if they don't know how successful we are, of course, they are not going to side with us and turn against the enemy. My question is -- I have looked at the drafts of the manual and hearing the doctrine is going to push change in the force structure. In conversations I've had with IO and cy-ops over the last one or two years, what I keep hearing is that they don't talk to the PAOs. And what I see and hear is that there seems to be a disconnect when a story comes up, an issue comes up, a narrative needs to take place.

What happens is that there may be an aggressive action to create a narrative, structure of the story, truthful as it is, following the 4B, sometimes in the 4E just as you laid out very clearly. But then there is no handout to the PA once it becomes public information. And what happens with the example of the YouTube videos, as we have talked about, is a limited context that supplied with the release of information with the hopes that appropriate context is provided later on, whereas earlier in the stage, there may have been context provided to create a narrative. Do you see -- my questions, I have two questions; one, do you see 3-0 affecting the institutional culture that separates PA from everything else? And two, had Smith-Mundt, the law that commonly is perceived as a prohibition against propagandizing Americans -- did Smith-Mundt ever come up in your discussions about and in the rewrite of 3.0?

GEN. CALDWELL: What I'd tell you is yes and yes. Chapter seven, literally probably 20 minutes before this manual went to the printers here a week and a half ago on the latest version of this manual, was getting tweaked one more time by the literally almost by the chief of staff of the United States Army. I mean, General Casey was that intimately involved in that he did a video

teleconference with the team I have sitting here -- in fact, I had -- Clint Ancker was in his office with him in Washington. The vice chief of staff of the Army was there, the (trade-off ?) command was there, myself, Steve Leonard was at this end with me, and obviously, our STRATCOM team here.

And we had a discussion with Army APA, Army Public Affairs in there about PA, its relationship to IO, how it all fits together, the importance of the fact that information engagement is what has to synchronize both public affairs and information operations. It is absolutely imperative that the two are working and aware of what the other one is doing. And they have been synchronized. And so it's in the engagement area that we, in fact, are doing that. There is a clear difference and distinction: whereas public affairs is there to inform, information operations is there to influence foreign audiences. So there is a clear delineation between the two, but at the same time, it's imperative that they are complementary with each other.

So we think we have gotten at that fairly well in this new version, in this edition that is coming out. And chapter seven, again, we'll get that to you -- you know, if you can send Jack a note, we'll push you, again, today -- as anybody else that would like it -- the electrons of what went to the print plant, get this latest manual printed.

MR. HOLT: Okay, yeah. And I will get that to you all as soon as I can. And Nicholas, are you still with us?

Q Yeah, I'm still here.

MR. HOLT: Okay, Nicholas.

Q My question is about the scale of these operations. And I'm just wondering what are the countries -- or regions of countries that you're using to model what active peacekeeping operations might look like in the future outside, obviously, of Iraq and Afghanistan?

Hello?

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah, you know, I would tell you as we look at Bosnia and Kosovo, a lot of what the Europeans' experiences have been are different, you know, things that have been looked at very, very closely. You know, if you look at Australia and what they did in the Solomon Islands, I mean, there's a couple out there. And obviously, we're going to spend a lot of time looking at all those different ones too.

Q If I can follow up real quick, those are obviously valuable places to look at, but they're all much smaller in scale than Iraq or the regions of Afghanistan or Pakistan, and even somewhat smaller than Darfur -- well, I guess Bosnia is about the size of Darfur. So my question then is how does the army, given that it's difficult for the Army to maintain its pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, how do you scale up to potentially larger conflicts in places like Darfur or the Congo -- although I guess that's unlikely, but mostly Darfur?

GEN. CALDWELL: I guess the question is -- I'm just not quite sure -- I'm just trying to make sure I got this right. You mean, do we have the force structure that would allow us to gear up to operate in that environment? Or do we have the capability to?

Q Yeah, that's correct. I guess I'm just asking what are the limits of our current force structure and our expected force structure in terms of the size of the operations we could conduct?

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah, honestly, it's more of an operational type thing versus a doctrinal thing. But, you know, our chief has been real clear. You know, our Army is stressed to the point -- you know, I mean, we've been stretched so hard we are stressed. And you know, there is no -- I mean, we have not been able to come off the 15-month troop rotations yet because of the challenges that we face. So if in fact we were asked to participate in a military operation someplace in another part of the world, again not doctrinally, but operationally we'd have to go back in and take a hard look at what we would do and how we would do it, given the current ongoing requirements that exist both within Afghanistan and Iraq.

Q Thanks, do we have time for one more, Jack?

MR. HOLT: Yeah, go ahead.

Q I have one on appropriations. So it sounds like you're talking about an increase in spending on training and on personnel with specific skill sets. Do you have any sense of what the offsets might be, what priorities the Army might be willing to scale back or postpone in order to ramp up its stabilization capability?

GEN. CALDWELL: That's a good question. I don't really have the latest of what the Army is saying -- thinking back in Washington. I can tell you though that this whole aim point that you're going to see in FM-7-0 training in fact shouldn't drive a refocus of where some of our emphasis is today on that high-end scale of operations. Doctrine is supposed to drive change, both within organizational structures in our institutional training base and everywhere else. And 7-0 will in fact put much greater emphasis on less than full spec high-end operations.

So we've had an ongoing dialogue with Army G3 to make sure they are aware of continuously where we are and what we're saying because the chief of staff of the Army has been approving this with our periodic updates we give him every couple of weeks. And so, there will have to be a refocusing for sure, and then whatever else additional beyond that really probably need to let the Army staff address with you. Although I can tell you, they have more requirements now for additional force structure than they have -- structure out there that we're adding to the Army. I don't think anybody would argue that part.

Q Great, thanks so much.

MR. HOLT: Okay, all right, yeah, we're just about out of time here. Jared, are you still with us? Q Jack, this is David Axe. I jumped in.

MR. HOLT: Oh, did you? Okay, yeah, David, real quick.

Q Sure, great. Yeah, I do have one question. Sir, do you see any dissonance between this Army that's emerging -- Army doctrine and the doctrine of our other military branches? In other words, is this going to jive with thinking in the Marine Corps, in the Navy, in the Air Force?

GEN. CALDWELL: I would tell you, we have worked real closely with Joint Forces Command and the other services as we've been writing this to keep

them fully informed and aware of where we're going with this FM 3-0 manual. So when it comes out, I think we'll find we're in close sync with the Marine Corps from our discussion and ongoing interactions we've had with them.

So from the ground perspective, the challenge still -- I can tell you -- is the whole interagency, the whole government aspects of it because we have not -- although we're spending a tremendous amount of time and effort and energy to bring the whole government on, it's still proving to be a challenging aspect. Every time we are in Washington briefing a member of Congress or some other organization, they say, what can we do to help? We're not asking for more Army force structure. What we're saying is we need greater interagency engagement and involvement in this process so that we are working as the whole of government and not just the military aspects because we all know the military can win any engagement we are involved in, but we are never going to win the peace alone. So until we can get the interagency, the whole of government engaged, we're going to continue to be challenged.

Yeah, Clint wants to add one thing.

CLINT ANCKER (U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER): Yeah, this is Clint Ancker. I would add that joint publication 30 -- joint operations -- has already adopted, and adopted in 2006 the idea of simultaneous offense, defense, and stability operations very similar to the construct that we're using in this manual here. The origination of this whole idea of the three-bloc war a U.S. Marine Corps idea, so we are in sync with joint publications and we are also very closely in line with the Marine Corps and how they're approaching it.

Q I'm hearing all of this emphasis on syncing with the Marine Corps. But it seems like there might be some dissonance there, especially with the Air Force that would have a more high intensity, conventional operations kind of focus.

GEN. CALDWELL: No, obviously, I can see your question you're asking there, but I can tell you that there is the recognition of what we're doing for the aspects on the ground, how critical that is. Jack, listen, we'd love to do this again if everybody would like to. You know, if I could, I'd just like to tell everybody there, thanks for taking your time to join us today. We appreciate what each and every one of you are doing to make sure other people are better informed. And we would love to assist and help however we can in answering any and all questions you have.

I think you all have Jack's contact information. He has ours. If you want to pass it to him and then our folks will work to get right back to you. For sure, we'll get to each of you today a final version of the manual in digital form that went to the print plant. And I'll ask my folks to make sure that that gets out today. And then, of course, we'll post a link to that manual on February 28th, this Thursday, when it's officially released too.

But I do want to just tell everybody thanks for doing this. We'd like to do more of it. We'll be glad to set up whatever specific elements you might like to talk about or if you want to do a point-to-point kind of discussion with any of our folks out here too at Ft. Leavenworth in the combined arms center, and the Command General Staff College will be glad to set that up also.

MR. HOLT: All right, sir, thank you very much. We appreciate you being with us. I know we're running a little bit long today, but we do appreciate you being with us. And guys, I will send this information to you

just as soon as we get it. And let me know, and I'll work with you and Ft. Leavenworth will set up our next one. Thank you very much.

END.